









Firm-level Determinants of Liquidity:
The Case of NSE-Listed Kenyan Banks
TimAvedi~usungu
077480
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
Bachelor of Business Science in Financial Economics at Strathmore University











































I decla re tha t this work has not been previou sly sub mitted and approved for the
award of a degree by this or any other Uni versity. To the bes t of my knowled ge and
belief, the Research Proposal contains no materi al pr eviously published or w ritten by
ano the r person exce pt wh ere du e reference is mad e in the Research Proposal itse lf.
© No part of this Research Proposal may be reproduced without the permission of
the author and Strathmore University
~~~ ~~.~~ ~~~.n;:i;'l~~l~,:;ate]
.....Q.r:?/.L?./. .?:::.?..Lf? [Date]
Th is Research Proposal has been submitted for examination w ith my approval as the
Supervisor.
Mary Mutinda [Name of Supervisor]
.........M~ [Signature]
t>rll ~ 'I(,... .... ... ..... ................................................ [Date]
School of Finance and Applied Economics
Strathmore University
2
2. Introduction Error! Bookmark not defined.
2.1. Background 5
Table of Co ntents




Problem stat emen t 7
1
1
2.4. Objectives and Questions 8
2.4.1. Research Objectives 8
2.4.2. Research Questions 8
2.5. Justification 9
3. Literature Review Error! Bookmark not defined.
3.1. Introduction 10
3.1.1. The Global Macroeconomic Co11text 10
3.1.2. The Local Context 14
3.2. Theoretical Framework 16
3.2.1. KeJ} definitions 16
3.2.2. Theories ofLiquidity Management 17
3.2.2.1. Commercial Loan Theory (or Real Bills Doctrine) 18
3.2.2.2. Shiftability theory 18
3.2.2.3. Anticipated Income theory 19
3.2.2.4. Liability Management 19
3.3. Core Bank Indicators 20
3.4. Discussion of Previous research 21
4. Research Methodology 22
4.1. Model Specification 22
4.2. Key Assumptions for Fixed effects 22
4.3. Methodology 23
4.4. Di agnostic tests 23
4.5. Specification of vari ab les 24
5. Results and D iscussions 25
5.1. Summary St ati stics 25
5.2. Size and Significance 27
5.3. Sign: Anticipated and Actua l Results 28




Limitations & Recommendations 30 J
7. List of References 31





















What are the key determinants of Liquidity in Kenyan Commercial banks? In the af-
termath of the Global Financial Crisis as well as recent eve n ts in the Kenyan context,
Liquidity and its management have been a crucial concern to industry thought lead-
ers and policymakers. (Mwangi, 2014) and (Mugenyah, 2015) began the conversation
in the Kenyan context. However, a more rigorous study is required to advance the
debate and the current paper seeks to do just that. A panel data methodology is
adopted with bank-fixed effects on a sample of 11 banks and 10 time periods. Two
liquidity indicators serve as regressands and a set of core bank indicators as regres-
sors. The author attempts to identify the 'best set' of core bank indicators that ulti-
mately predict or determine liquidity in Kenyan Commercial Banks. Net Loans to
Total Assets Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Total Capital Ratio emerged as the most
significant factors, highlighting the key role that bank specialization and Capital Ad-





February 2008. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) publishes the 'Principles
for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Superoision', a handbook that was devel-
oped to serve a pressing need for regulation and management of liquidity risk all
across the developed world. This publication, and subsequent related documents,
came to be popularly known as 'Basel III' . Basel III reflected the emphasis on and
drive towards common measures and standards for liquidity risk and its manage-
ment.
March 2008. Bear Stearns, a well-respected and storied firm on Wall Street, is em-
broiled in a crisis, facing near collapse. A sudden liquidity squeeze caused by its large
exposure to devalued mortgage-backed securities led to a wave of panic among firms
associated with Bear and even to the exodus of a growing number of its trading coun-
terparties. (Shorter, 2008). This string of events led to a drop in Bear's cushion of li-
quidity reserves and spurred the resulting intervention by the Federal Reserve and
J.P Morgan Chase, the second largest lender in the United States.
September IS, 2008. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., the fourth-largest U.s. invest-
ment bank at the time, filed for bankruptcy. Thus began the largest bankruptcy in U'S
history then and since. Its demise was attributed to the firm's significant exposure to
the subprime mortgage and real estate market, the initial source of the financial crisis
that began the previous year. Ultimately, the unanimous conclusion was that it was
an inability to secure funding that was Lehman's undoing (Wiggins et .al, 2014).
June 2015 to April 2016. Almost 6 years later, a string of 3 bank failures in the Kenyan
Banking sector occur in the span of 9 months. All 3 banks were put under receivership
by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), with a consensus emerging that liquidity played
a key role in these events.
These anecdotal accounts serve to lay the groundwork for the main thrust of this
study, which will attempt to establish, through multiple regression analysis, the key
drivers of firm-level liquidity risk from a sample of listed commercial banks in Kenya.
In this chapter, a detailed description of each of the key events mentioned above will
be made, including a statement of the problem to be examined and the motivation
and justification for the study. In Chapter 2, a review of the literature will expound
on the definitions of key terms as well as on major theories on liquidity management.
Core bank indicators used shall also be identified and subsequently categorized. Is-
sues regarding the particular methodological approach shall be covered in Chapter 3















The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 was a watershed moment in the financial world
in the sense that it revealed systemic weaknesses in the regulatory and capital market
structures of global and domestic financial markets. In the aftermath of the crisis,
there was a general sense that banks had not fully appreciated the importance of li-
quidity risk management and the implications of such risk for the bank itself, as well
as the wider financial system. (Mwangi, 2014). This spurred the development of new
regulations encouraging higher capital requirements, less bank interconnectivity and
more importantly, more rigorous liquidity risk management practices.
In the local context, a string of 3 bank failures in the span of 9 months raises important
questions about the current liquidity positions and liquidity risk management strate-
gies employed by Kenyan Banks. This motivates an academic study into liquidity risk
management in general and an analysis of the Firm-level determinants of liquidity
risk in listed Kenyan commercial banks in particular. This is what this current project
aims to achieve.
A number of pioneering studies on liquidity risk and its management in the local
context have been made. (Mwangi, 2014) looked into the effect of liquidity risk man-
agement on the performance of commercial banks listed on the Nairobi Securities Ex-
change (NSE). Adopting a descriptive study design and applying multiple regression
analysis, (Mwangi, 2014) found that liquidity risk had a significant negative relation-
ship with financial performance in the sample of commercial banks, In a separate
study, (Mugenyah, 2015) examined the determinants of liquidity risk in Kenyan com-
mercial banks. Through a descriptive study design coupled with multiple regression
analysis, (Mugenyah, 2015) analyzed data from the listed banks' financial statements
finding that all but one of the core bank indicators he identified exl1ibited a strong
and significant relationship with liquidity risk.
Two criticisms by the author regarding these empirical studies are that (1) the meth-
odological approach adopted was not rigorous or comprehensive enough and that (2)
the period of study was too short (less than 5 years) . In this regard, the author of this
proposal intends to expand the scope of the period under study (2004-2014) . Moreo-
ver the methodological approach shall endeavor to be more comprehensive and rig-
orous, using a battery of sophisticated diagnostic tests. Hence, using a larger time
horizon and enhanced methodology, the goal of the study is to ultimately advance
the understanding of liquidity risk management in listed Kenyan Banks.
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1.3. Problem statement
Liquidity risk management is one of the key lessons learnt from the Global Financial
Crisis. The market turmoil that began in mid-2007 re-emphasized the importance of
liquidity to the functioning of financial markets and the banking sector (BCBS, 2011).
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published 'Liquidity
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges', The difficulties outlined in the paper
highlighted that many banks had failed to take account of a number of bas ic princi-.
pIes of liquidity risk management when liquidity was plentiful (BCBS, 2011). With
the collapse of banks once regarded as 'too big to fail' by industry experts, many rec-
ognized the deficiency in measures to control this key metric.
Banks playa crucial role in any economy, acting as providers of capital as well as
playing a key role in maturity transformation (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). In its role
as an agent in maturity transformation, a bank will be faced with the inevitable prob-
lem of a liquidity mismatch where long-term illiquid assets are used to fund short-
term liquid liabilities. The implication of this characteristic is that liquidity risk in in-
herent in the very structure of banks (Diamond & Dybvig, 1999).
In Kenya, a string of 3 bank failures in the span of 9 months raised multiple concerns
about the stability of the banking sector. Although there is yet to be a consensus on
the causes of such failures, this study argues that a common consequence was a fail-
ure in liquidity risk management to mitigate or prevent these crises.
It has been noted by the author that academic research on the topic of liquidity risk
management in the Kenyan context is sparse at best. Accordingly, this study seeks to
help in filling that gap by attempting to identify drivers of liquidity risk in banks. In
conducting this investigation, a set of liquidity risk metrics and core bank indicators
will be specified. Multiple regression analysis will be implemented to establish any
significant relationships between variables as well as to specify a predictive model for
firm-level liquidity risk. This work will contribute to the conversation on liquidity

























To id entify key Firm-leve l determinants of liqu idity in listed , Kenyan com-
mercial banks.
To evaluate the impact of these key determinants on firm-level liquidity in







I. What are the key Firm-level determinants of liquidity in listed Kenyan com-
mercial banks?
ii. What is the impact of these key determinants on firm-level liquidity in listed
Kenyan commercial banks? .
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1.5. Justification
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 was seen by many observers at the time to be a
crisis sparked off by two major events in the banking sector: the near-collapse and
bankruptcy of Bear Stearns (Bear) and Lehman Brothers (Lehman) respectively. At
Bear, the bank holding company's reserves were steadily eroded as confidence in the
robustness and survival value of the bank dimmed. Bear had to be 'rescued' by the
Federal Reserve andl.P Morgan Chase through a private agreem ent. Lehman suf-
fered a bigger blow, failing to raise sufficient funds to operate, thereby being forced
to file for bankruptcy in September 15th 2008 (Wiggins et.al 2014). Publications like
the 'Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision' in 2008 by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) established the importance of liquidity risk
management in banks and to bank regulators worldwide. In Kenya, 3 bank failures
occurring under 9 months proved a keen illustration of banks' fragility with regard
to failure to acquire funding sources in a timely manner and, most importantly,
weathering bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).
Consequently, in the global marketplace, liquidity risk and its management has be-
come central to the objective of promoting bank resilience to acute stress scenarios,
both in the short term and the long-term (BCBS, 2011). In a KPMG report, the antici-
pated effects of the introduction and implementation of Basel III - the liquidity risk
management framework established by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision
(BCBS)- included the crowding out of weaker banks, Significant downward pressure
on bank profitability as well as reduced lending capacity in the long-term in individ-
ual banks. This is considered as the necessary cost of reduced risk of a systemic bank-
ing crisis in the financial system, such as the one seen during the Global Financial
Crisis (KPMG, 2011).
The above discussion serves to motivate studies into liquidity risk and its drivers in
the Kenyan Banking Sector. It is argued that such studies would serve to rehabilitate
public confidence in the stability and resilience of Kenyan commercial banks. Such
studies would also serve as a basis for proper, local-based liquidity risk management
policies and programs at individual banks. Thus the focus of this research paper is to
identify and measure the significance of determinants of liquidity risk at the firm level
in listed commercial banks in Kenya.
A few forays have been made in examining this issue through efforts by (Mugenyah,
2015) and (Mwangi, 2014). The basic methodological approach is the same in terms of
regression of one liquidity risk metric against multiple core bank indicators. How-
ever, the sample size in the current study is smaller - limited to listed banks - and the
period of study is longer (11 years) . Moreover, a more rigorous methodological ap-









2.1.1.TIle Global Macroeconomic Context
(BCBS, 2011).
'During the early "liquidity phase" of the financial crisis, many banks - despite ade-
quate capital levels - still experienced difficulties because they did not manage their
liquidity in a prudent manner. The crisis again drove home the importance of liquid-
ity to the proper functioning of financial markets and the banking sector.'
l
1
2.1.1.1. The Global Financial Crisis & Liquidity Risk
l
I, l
The remark above by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) is illus-
trative of the key role of liquidity risk and its management in current financial mar-
kets. The Basel Committee went on to describe the effects of the crisis and its key
lessons -'The rapid reversal in market conditions illustrated how quickly liquidity
can evaporate.. .The banking system came under severe stress... necessitated central
bank action to support...money markets and .. .individual institutions'. The Commit-
tee also expressed the opinion that liquidity risk had not got its fair share of concern
: ' .. .there is a general sense that banks had not fully appreciated the importance of
liquidity risk management and the implications of such risk for the bank itself, as well
as the wider financial system. (BCBS, 2011)'
This led to a general consensus and an international desire for common measures and
standards for liquidity risk, thus spurring the BCBS to publish various works relating
to liquidity risk management, the first of which was called 'Principles for Sound li-
quidity Risk Management and Superoisiou' in 2008 - unofficially known as 'Basel Ill'.
(Mwangi, 2014) described the effect it had on policy makers, suggesting that the in-
troduction of Basel III led them to suggest more liquidity holdings in banks to help
self-insure against potential liquidity or funding difficulties. Two major cases during
the Global Financial Crisis would help to put this discussion on Basel III in perspec-
tive and to demonstrate the urgent need for it at the time. They are the near-collapse




In March 2008, Bear Stearns (Bear), the fifth largest investment banking firm in the
U.s, was battered by what its officials described as a sudden liquidity squeeze related
to its large exposure to devalued mortgage-backed securities (Shorter 2008). Rumors
about European financial institutions that had stopped transacting with Bear made
their North American counterparts nervous, leading to announcements by some US-
based fixed-income and stock traders of their intention to halt their involvement with
Bear.
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What followed was a deluge of departures, withdrawals or draw-downs from multi-
ple other trading counterparties like hedge funds, large investment banks, money
market funds and institutional investors. According to Shorter (2008), this ongoing
activity contributed to a precipitous and alarming drop in Bear's cushion of liquidity
reserves.
Bear's liquidity crisis and the resulting Fed intervention sent alarms throughout the
stock markets over Bear's fragility . It also led to concerns about the potential precari-
ousness of other major financial institutions (Shorter, 2008). This marked the begin-
nings of a global phenomenon that we now know the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-
8.
2.1.1.1.2. Lehman Brothers
On September 15,2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehman) sought Chapter 11
protection, initiating the largest bankruptcy proceeding in United States (U.s.) his-
tory. At the time, Lehman was the fourth-largest u.s. investment bank, with 25,000
employees worldwide.
Lehman's demise was a seminal event in the financial crisis, a global phenomenon
that began in the U.s. subprime mortgage industry in 2007, spread to the credit mar-
kets, and then burned through the world's financial markets. The crisis resulted in
significant and wide losses to the economy. And this was despite the unprecedented
efforts of the u.s. Federal Reserve, the U. S. Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the central banks of the world's developed countries to in-
tervene and stabilize their economies (Wiggins, 2014).
March 2006 marked a change in business strategy for Lehman. The firm went on an
aggressive acquisition strategy in the housing market, despite rumors that it had
peaked. (Wiggins 2014) mused that they must have hoped to capitalize on their sig-
nificant experience in the real estate sector. What was 'new' about Lehman's strategy
was that it involved acquiring assets as investments as opposed to what they tradi-
tionally did, which involved acquisitions and securitization, effectively moving the
assets to 3rd parties.
In this way, they retained all the investments' risk and return on its books in hopes of
greater profits (Wiggins, 2014).
Targeted growth areas were its proprietary businesses - commercial real estate, lev-
eraged loans and private equity which, as (Wiggins 2014) noted, put more capital at
risk in the event the investments turned sour. It is also crucial to note that these areas
were also significantly more illiquid than Lehman's traditional lines of business.
Through 2006, Lehman aggressively bought real estate assets. Its first big blow came
in August 2007, when it announced the closure of its main subprime origination plat-
form - BNC Mortgage - reflecting declines in US housing prices and a difficult finan-
cial environment. At the end of its 2007 fiscal year, Lehman held $111 billion in real








"Strong capital requirements are a necessary condition for banking sector stability but
by themselves are not sufficient. A strong liquidity base reinforced through robust




(BCBS2011/ Sec. B- Introducing a Global Liquidity Standard)
During the early "liquidity phase" of the financial crisis, many banks - despite ade-
quate capital levels - still experienced difficulties because they did not manage their
liquidity in a prudent manner. The crisis again drove home the importance of liquid-
ity to the proper functioning of financial markets and the banking sector (BCBS,2011).
Moreover, rapid reversals in market conditions helped illustrate the temporary na-
ture of liquidity and the long-lasting character of illiquidity. As the banking system
came under severe stress, central banks had to step in to support both the functioning
of the money markets as well as some individual institutions.
The difficulties experienced by some banks were due to lapses in basic principles of
liquidity risk management (BCBS, 2011). In response to this situation, the Basel Com-
mittee for Banking Supervision (,The Committee') published in February 2008 the
'Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision', a publication
that would be popularly referred to as 'Basel III' .
Basel III provided detailed guidance on the risk management and supervision of
funding liquidity risk and was targeted at helping promote better risk management
in this critical area. Further, The Committee developed two minimum standards for
funding liquidity to help strengthen its liquidity framework. The first standard was
the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) whose main objective was to promote short-term
resilience of a bank's liquidity risk (BCBS, 2011). The second standard was called the
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) whose main objective was to promote resilience
over a longer time horizon by" ... creating additional incentives for a bank to fund its
activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis" (BCBS,
2011).
2.1.1.2.2. Anticipated impact
In analyzing the anticipated impact of the Basel III document in financial markets and
institutions, a report by KPMG summed up its insights into two categories; impact on
individual banks and on the financial system in general.
As far as individual banks are concerned, raising the required capital to comply with
Basel III standards might result in the departure or consolidation of smaller and, by
extension, weaker banks. The increased cost of funding would also put significant
pressure on the bank profitability as margins tightened . Moreover, a shift towards
longer-term funding arrangements is likely to be observed, given the fact that Basel












Concerns raised by ratings agencies about these types of assets as w ell as their con-
stant revaluation by Lehma n would contribute to signi ficant write-offs throughout
2008 (Wiggins, 2014).
The nea r collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 raised fears that Lehman would be
next. It faced higher cos ts of credit as its perceiv ed financial position worsened, with
som e lenders withdrawing their funds, refus ing to roll ove r repos (or repurchase
ag reements), dem anding bigger haircu ts (or discounts) and even refusing to accept
all but a narrow type of collateral. These demands severely restricted Lehman's access
to funding (Wiggins, 2014) thereby putting the firm in a very precarious position and
facing imminent collapse.
The weekend of September 12-14, 2008 saw a meeting of the CEOs of major Wall
Street Investment banks with other regulators to hammer out a private sector solution
for Lehman. Unfortunately, due to multiple reasons, the emergency meeting failed to
yield results. This meant that Lehman would not be able to raise enough funds to
open for business the next day. Reali zing this, the Lehman Board of directors voted
to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection which was done on September 15, 2008.
Lehman 's significant exposure to the US subprime mortgage and real estate markets
was a key factor that led to its demise. When these markets slowed down, they
sparked a retraction in funding for short-term loans, on which Lehman, like most in-
vestment banks, relied practicall y on a daily basis.
Since Lehman's long term ass ets were funded by short-term debt borrowed in the
billions of dollars - $200 billion - each da y in the overnight wholesale funding mar-
kets, its collateral base quickly became toxic to Lehman's lenders, leading to an ero-
sion in Lehman's ability to continue to carry out its short-term obligations.
(Wiggins, 2014) noted that hesitation or stricter standards by a small number of lend-
ers could (and did) cause significant funding problems for the firm . Ultimately, it was






Regarding the effects on the financial system, the risk of a systemic banking crisis
would be radically reduced. Enhanced liquidity buffers coupled with higher risk
management standards and greater capability would reduce institutional intercon-
nectivity thus whittling down systemic risks. Additionally, in the longer run, it is ex-
pected that the significant increases in liquidity requirements would lead to either the
decline in the capacity for bank lending activities or a spike in lending costs. Further-
more, investors may turn away from investing in bank debt or equity issuances ex-
pecting low returns since dividends may be have to be slashed to enable the rebuild-
ing of capital bases. Lastly, inconsistent application and implementation of Basel III
across different jurisdictions might engender international arbitrage hence disrupting
the overall stability of the financial system.
2.1.2.The Local Context
2.1.2.1. Dubai Bank
In July 14 th 2015, Dubai bank came under the radar of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK
or The Regulator) by breaching its daily cash reserve ratio requirements. The situation
deteriorates continuously since then thus raising red flags with The Regulator. In Aug
14 th 2015, the bank was put under receivership with CBK citing serious capital and
liquidity shortfalls in the bank's position. The regulator also pointed out the bank's
weak corporate governance structures given the fact that its problems stemmed from
not s? legitimate activities by the Chairman and Managing Director. On Aug 241h
2015, ~The Kenya Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) recommended .the liquida-
tion of the bank which, considering the magnitude of weaknesses in the bank's posi-
tion, seemed like the only feasible option in their considered opinion.
2.1.2.2. Imperial Bank
On October 13lh 2015, the CBK puts Imperial Bank Limited (IBL) under receivership
citing significant shortfalls in IBL's capital position as well as the clear misrepresen-
tation of IBL's financial position in the firm's annual report. On Dec 2nd 2015, Kenya
Commercial Bank (KCB) and Diamond Trust Bank (DTB), two large Tier I lenders,
stepped:in to provide depositors with access to their deposits in a structured manner
with a c:'umulative pay-out ratio estimated at 59%. On March 7th 2016: JBE (Uganda)
sold its shares to Exim bank Ltd (Uganda) for the sum of approximately $6.8m, sig-
naling the imminent wind-up of the bank in neighboring countries. On June 21s1 2016,
NIC Bank (Kenya) got involved to provide depositors access to a portion of their de-
posits in a structured manner as well as play the role of Asset and Liabilities Consultant.
In this position, NIC would be involved in the assessment of assets and liabilities,
provide support for the recovery of IBL's loans as well as give guidance on other as-
sets and on staffing.
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2.1.2.3. Chase Bank
On April 7th 2016, Chase Bank (Kenya) was put under receivership following liquidity
issu es at the financial in termediary as a resul t of a run on the bank. The bank run was
fueled by social media reports that circulated a week before its closure about its im-
minent collapse. This follow ed the re-publishing of its financial results for the year
ende d 2015 w here the bank recorded a steep drop in profitability and a disclosure of
close to 14 billion shillings lent to insiders, a figure well above statu tory limi ts. In
addition, a sudden change in management where the bank's Chairman and CEO both
resigned shook public confidence in the viability of the bank's financial position. On
April 20th : KCB, stepped in as a 'Manager' for the bank. It reaches an agreement with
the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) on modalities to reopen Chase Bank Ltd and even-
tually acquire a majority stake in the bank. KCB's status as a major player in the Bank-
ing sector was meant to lend credibility to the bank reopening and to restore public






















(Nikolau, 2009) argued that liqu id ity (in general) relates to the ability of an
econo mic agent to exchan ge his or her exis ting w ealth for goods and ser vices
or for other assets. In this sense, liquidity can be understood as a 'flaw concept '
where it would indicate financial flows among the central bank, commercial
banks and markets. By extension, the inability to realize these flows would
constitute'illiquidihf
The particular variant of liquidity that is crucial to this paper's discussion is
funding Iiouidiiu' which is defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (BCBS) as the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet ob-
ligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses (BCBS,
2008). A related definition is given by (Borio, 2000), (Strahan, 2008) or (Brun-
nerrneier and Pedersen, 2007) who all define funding liquidity as the ability
to raise cash at short notice either via asset sales or new borrowing. Looked at
from a different angle, (Nikolau, 2009) defined funding liquidity as the ability
to settle obligations with immediacy. Thus a bank is illiquid if it is unable to
settle obligations in time (Drehmann & Nikolau, 2008).
2.2.1.2. Liquidity sources
(Nikolau,2009) identified three key sources of liquidity for financial interme-
diaries. The first source identified was the bank's depositors, who entrust their
money to the bank. The financial markets constitute the second liquidity
source which comprise of the asset market, where the bank can always go to
sell its assets or to generate liquidity through securitization or loan syndica-
tion, and the interbank market, arguably the most important source of bank
liquidity. Lastl y, a bank can also choose to get liquidity directly from the cen-
tral bank through cash reserves held and the discount window.
2.2.1.3. Funding Liquidity Risk
J
Following our discussion of funding liquidity, the concept that captures' the
inability of a financial intermediary to service the ir liabilities as they fall due'
(Nikolau, 2009) would be call ed funding liquidity risk.
(BCBS, 2008) went further and defined funding liquidity risk as 'the risk that
the finn will not be abl e to meet both unexpected and expected current and
future cash flow and collateral needs without affecting eithe r dail y operation s





(Matz & Neu, 2007) identified maturity transformation as one of the two pri-
mary economic functions that banks provide. The seminal paper by (Diamond
& Dybvig, 1983) gave the first explicit analysis of the demand for liquidity and
the 'transformation service' provided by banks. This' transformation service'
involves taking liquid short-term deposits (liabilities) and lending out illiquid
long-term loans (assets). Putting it differently, banks can transform illiquid
assets (loans) into more liquid demand deposits (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).
As (Gambacorta, 2003) noted, assets typically have longer maturities with re-
spect to liabilities, hence the term' maturity transformation' . The fundamental
role played by banks in maturity transformation makes them inherently vul-
nerable to funding liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that
which affects markets as a whole (BCBS,2008).
This is because of the fact that, on a strict contractual basis, banks always have
far more obligations (liabilities) due on demand or within a very short time
frame than they have assets due on demand or maturing within a very short




2.2.1.5. Liquidity Risk Management
A bank should have a sound process for identifying, measuring, monitoring
and controlling liquidity risk. This process should include a robust framework
for comprehensively projecting cash flows arising from assets, liabilities and
off-balance sheet items over an appropriate set of time horizons (BCBS, 2008).
Effective liquidity risk management helps ensure a bank's ability to meet cash
flow obligations, which are uncertain as they are affected by external events
and other agents' behavior. According to the Basel Committee, effective li-
quidity risk management refers to the set of policies and practices that help
ensure a bank's ability to meet its cash flow obligations. Liquidity risk man-
agement is of paramount importance because a liquidity shortfall at a single
institution can have system-wide repercussions (BCBS, 2008). This was evi-
dent during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 in the high profile bank fail-
ures in the case of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns.
2.2.2.Theories of Liquidity Management
This section looks at the key theories that have shaped current understanding of li-
quidity and its management in financial institutions. They include the Commercial















The theory states that a commercial bank should only advance short-term, self-liqui-
dating, productive loans to businesses i.e. short-term commercial paper.
The short-term constraint is crucial since banks settle their obligations or liabilities on
demand. They cannot meet these obligations if assets are tied up for long periods of
time. In other words, banks need a continua! and substantia! flow of cash moving
through them and this can only be maintained if banks limit their lending activities
to short-term maturities.
The self-liquidation criterion refers to the property loans have to liquidate themselves
(or turn into a positive cash inflow for the bank). In this case, since loans fund pro-
ductive activities - i.e. the financing of production and movement of goods through
the various stages of manufacture, storage, transportation and distribution - they self-
liquidate only when such productive goods are eventually sold.
The implication of this point of view for regulator action is that a central bank should
only lend to banks on the security of such short-term loans in order to ensure sustain-
able liquidity levels in commercial banks as well as sufficient money supply in the
whole economy. However, a criticism against this theory is that it entails a miscon-
ception of how loans are created i.e. on the goods themselves rather than on the value
of the goods. In addition, this value is subject to fluctuations depending on the health
of the economy.
2.2.2.2. Shiftability theory
The central thesis of this theory is that the liquidity of a bank is dependent on its
ability to shift its assets to another party without any material or capital loss when the
need for liquidity arises i.e. a bank having 'shiftable assets' . It therefore implies that
banks can accumulate and maintain a substantial amount of these 'shiftable assets'
without needing to worry about maturity i.e. it was acceptable to hold assets with
long-term maturities provided they are' shiftable'. Generally though, shiftable assets
are most often assets with short-term maturities. A perfectly shiftable asset is one that
is immediately transferable without capital loss when the need for liquidity arises.
This definition is applicable to short-term market instruments (or investments) such
as T-bills and bills of exchange.
The theory's main innovation was broadening the list of assets that qualify as legiti-
mate for bank ownership by redirecting the attention of banks and banking authori-
ties from loans (as in the Real Bills doctrine) to investments (T-bills and bills of ex-
change). Putting it differently, the fundamental source of liquidity became bank's sec-
ondary sources i.e. money markets.
The main shortcoming was not with the theory itself but with the bank management
practices that grew ou t of the theory. The key weakness was that in as much as it was
possible for a singl e bank to maintain needed liquidity by shifting its assets, the situ-
ation becomes untenable if all banks behaved this way (the fallacy of composition).
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This implied that problems of liquidity in the whole banking system are not solvable
at the micro-level, i.e. through individual banks, but rather at the macro-level,
through regulator action. This justifies the need for quick and decisive action by reg-




2.2.2.3. Anticipated Income theory 1
According to this theory, banks should plan on loan liquidation based on the antici-
pated income of the borrower, regardless of the nature and character of the bor-
rower's business. The main consequence of this is that banks could make long-term
and non-business loans. This principle was contrary to the 'Real Bills doctrine' which
emphasized that loans be short-term and productive (or business-related). This de-
parture from doctrine was justified by the rationale that even a 'real biII' is repaid out
of the future earnings of the borrower i.e. their anticipated income.
A secondary implication was that given the nature and frequency of future income
flows, the loan would be repaid in instalments as opposed to being repaid in a lump
sum. This contradicted the Commercial loan theory, where the loan was liquidated
only after goods had been sold i.e. in a lump sum payment.
l
2.2.2.4. Liability Management
The major innovation of this theory was in rethinking the way banks traditionally
sourced for liquidity. It asserted that banks could acquire liquidity by creating addi-
tional liabilities against itself in the event of a liquidity need. They could do this by
borrowing reserves in the money market. The creation of such liabilities includes the
issuing of time certificate of deposits, borrowing from other commercial banks, bor-
rowing from the central bank, issuing of shares to raise capital funds and finally
ploughing back the bank's profits through retained earnings.
As a result of this innovation, 'liquidity management' was considered parallel to 'lia-
bility management' . In other words, bank could go out into the market and 'buy
money' or 'buy liquidity' in the form of liabilities such as various bank-related money
market instruments in order to meet loan requests or to pay demand deposits i.e. to











2.3. Core Bank Indicators
The table below outlines the metrics to be used in the research study. The major cate-
gories of core bank indicators that will be examined include liquidity, solvency, prof-
itability, size, efficiency and specialization.
Liquidity metrics
Liquid asset ratios (LAR)
Deposit runcffratio (ORR)
Loans to Depositsratio (LOR)
Solvency metrics
Total Capital ratio (TCR)




Return on Assets (RDA)




Net Loans-to-Total Assets Ratio (NLTAR)
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2.4. Discussion of Previous research
Two empirical studies were identified as closely correlated to the nature and general
direction of the author's study.
(Mwangi, 2014) sought to determine the effect of liquidity risk on the performance of
commercial banks listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. Adopting a descriptive
study design and taking data from listed commercial banks for the period 2010 to
2013, (Mwangi, 2014) applied regression analysis in identifying the effectsof a speci-
fied set of liquidity and other indicators on bank performance. The results found were
that the liquidity risk metric had a significant negative relationship with financial per-
formance of commercial banks in the sample. Although the main focus of (Mwangi,
2014) was on determining the commercial effect of various liquidity and other met-
rics, it assisted in clarifying the research methodology as well as in defining the set of
indicators used in the current study.
(Mugenyah, 2014) aimed to establish the determinants of liquidity risk in commercial
banks in Kenya. Implementing a descriptive study design and taking data from the
financial statements of listed commercial banks for the period 2010 to 2014, (Mugen-
yah, 2014) applied regression analysis to identify key drivers of liquidity risk. The
conclusion made was that most performance metrics identified were significant driv-
ers of liquidity risk with the key exception being the capital adequacy ratio. (Mugen-
yah, 2014) was much more aligned with the objectives of the current study the author
found the methodology lacking in rigour and the sample period (2010-2014) too short.
This research report aims to improve on both studies identified above by expanding
the set of core bank indicators and liquidity risk metrics as well as the sample period
(2004-2014). The methodological approach applied shall also strive to be more com-
prehensive and rigourous. Ultimately the current study aims to obtain a more rigor-


















This chapter sets out to present the methodology used to further the topic of interest.
Since we are working with cross-sectional time-series data (or panel data), we employ
the fixed effects model with implementation on STATA, a statistical software.
The period under study is from 2006 to 2015. The sample of banks taken is the 11
currently listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) . All the data required was
collected from the annual financial statements.
3.1. Model Specificati on
The following is simple representation of the model:
Liquidity lruiicatori; = ao + ai + fJ1Prof itabilitYit + fJzCapital AdequacYit + fJ3EfficiencYit
+fJ4Specializationit + fJsAbso lute Size., + vit
Where:
Liquidity lndicatorit is one of the 2 liquidity indicators (loan to deposit ratio & liquid assets ratio)
that was subsequently analyzed, ao is a constant, a, is the bank-fixed effect and Vit is the estimation
residual. As explanatory variables, a set of core bank indicators on capi tal ad equacy, size, profita-
bility, efficiency and specialization was used. Profitability., includes the net interest margin and
return on assets. Capital AdequacYit refers to the Tier 1 capital ratio and "To tal capital Ratio
Efficiency., is measured by the cost -to-income ratio. Specializationit is a measure of the extent to
which a bank speciali zes in lending, by considering net loans as a percentage of total assets, while
Absolute Size., is measured by the log of Assets for each bank i in time period t.
3.2. Key Assumptions for Fixed effects'
a. Each explanatory variable changes over time and lZO perfect linear relation-
ship exists among the explanatory variables
b. For each t, the expected ualue of the idiosyncratic error given the explanatonj
variables in all time periods and the unobserved effects is zero
c. The homoscedasticitsjtconstant variance) assumption
j Var (Uit IX i, a ;) = (J~
d. For all t =1= s r the idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated (conditional on all
explanatory variables and tu):
e. Conditional on Xi and ai r the uit are independent and identically distrib-
u ted as Normal (0. (J~)




Given the nature of panel (or longitudinal) data, we apply advanced panel
data methods and diagnostics in our analysis. Below is an outline of the key
steps followed in our analysis:
1) Taking balance sh eet data, create a .dta file.
2) Feed ing the data into STATA, set the data as panel data (xtset) with
' Banknamel ' as the panel or cross-sectional variable and 'Yr' as the
time variable.
3) Defining the core bank indicators as our initial list of independent
variables ($xlist) : see "Operationalization of variables" .
4) Running both fixed effects (fe) and random effects (re) regressions of
our dependent variables (liquidity ratios) to obtain a set of 6 models.
5) Using the Hausman test to decide between the 'fe' and 're' models
and settling on the subset of fe models.
6) Carrying out a 'goodness of fit' test on ourfe models and choosing
the two best ones.
7) Narrowing down on the 'best set' of independent variables. This is
done by carrying out a number of diagnostic tests on the models our
and sieving out the variables that prove insignificant.
8) This 'best set' is now assumed to represent the determinants of li-
quidity in Kenyan commercial banks.
9)
3.4. Diagnostic tests
The tests below were applied in step 6 of the Methodology in sieving out insig-
nificant variables. They were used sequentially hence were interpreted as 'lev-
els' which variables would attempt to 'reach'.
• Level 1: A typical Ieregression













3.5. Specification of variables
Variable Measurement
Dependent variables
Loan to deposit ratio (LOR) Gross Adva nces/ Cus tome r Dep osits
Liquid asset ratio (LAR) Liquid asse ts/ Total Assets
Deposit runoff ratio (ORR) Liquid assets/ Cus tome r Deposits
Independent variables
Total capital ratio (TCR) Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital! Risk Weighted Ass ets
Tier 1 capital ratio(TlCR) Tier 1 capital/ Risk Weighted Assets
Log of bank assets (LogBA) Ln (Bank Assets)
Return on assets (ROA) Profit Before Tax/Total Assets
Net interest margin (NIM) Net int erest income/Earning assets
Cost-to-income ratio(CIR) Operating expenses/Operating Income
Net loans to total assets ratio(NTAR) Net Advances/Total Assets
Specification of liquid assets
Liquid ass ets = Cash in hand + Balanc es with Central bank + Financial Investments/Investment Se-
curities + Balances/Placements with other banks - Balances/Loans du e to other banks
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4. Results and Discussions
4.1. Summary Statistics
This section will cover the key results from our analysis described in Section 4 as
well as providing a narrative to explain and contextualize them.
l
l
Table 1 provides summary statistics of core bank indicators for all the banks in
the sample. There is substantial variation in the bank size as measured by Total
Assets, even though the sample consisted of banks classified as Tier 1 (9 billion
for the smallest bank and approximately 558 billion for the largest). Substantial
dispersion is also observed in the capital adequacy ratios (Tier 1 & Total Capital "1
Ratios). There is markedly less dispersion in the profitability ratios (net interest I
margin & return on assets) as well as in the Cost-to-income ratio. Average val-
. \ues for Cost-to-income ratio and Net Loans to Total Assets are almost equal at
57%.
Table 1 Bank's characteristics
%
Mean min p25 p50 p75 p99 max
Total Assets 138,278,625 9,133,831 57,688,384 120,771,146 184,825,000 490,338,324 558,094,154
Total Capital Ratio 21.4 12.6 16.2 19.1 23.7 47.3 58.9
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 18.8 10.3 14.8 16.2 20.5 40.9 45.7
Net Interest Margin 7.40 1.18 5.59 7.47 9.29 12.3 12.6
Return on Assets 4.38 1.31 3.39 4.33 51.4 7.86 18.9
Cost-to-Income Ratio 57.7 32.8 46.9 56.5 66.6 86.7 87.3





l Table 2 provides summary statistics for the liquidity ind ica tors used in the regres-
sions. From Panel A, there is markedly more range in the Loans to Deposits ratio
than in the Liquid Assets Ratio. Panel B shows how the mean of the two indicators
evolve d over time. Two tim e periods look significant at first glance: 2006-7 exhibited
a significant jump in liqu idity and 2010-11 a steeper than usual drop in liquidity on
average.
Table 2 - Liquidity Indicators - Summary Statistics
Panel A - G loba l Summary Statistic s
Statistics N mean min p25 p50 p75 p99 max
Loans to Deposits Ratio 110 84.1 30.3 76.6 83.1 90.8 138.1 148.6
", Liquid Asse ts Ratio 110 30.7 9.03 25.1 30.2 35.5 69.71 71.86
( Panel B - Liquidity Indicators over time(mean)
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Loan s to Deposits ratio 86.43 78.4 79.97 78.62 78.37 84.82 84.28 86.92 90.69 92.6 84.11





4.2. Size and Significance
Table 3 summarizes the results regarding the magnitude and stati stical significance
of the determinants of liquid ity indicators.
For each liquidity indicator, there w ere 2 rounds of panel regressions (denoted la &
1b) in which insignificant determinants were dropped after the first round with only
the significant ones forming the set of independent variables in the second round .
Each regression assumed bank-fixed effects.




















Net Interest Margin 1.335
Return on Assets -0.812
Cost to Income Ra- -0.227
tio
Net Loans to Total 1.367
Assets Ratio
Tier 1 Capital Ratio -1.407
Total Capital Ratio 1.383
Log Assets -0.00797
Constant 0.233



























According to the table, the ideal set of regressors for each dependent variable be-
came:
1) Loans to Deposits Ratio: Net Loans to Total Assets Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ra-
tio and Total Capital Ratio





Return on Assets as a measure of profitability exhibits a positive relationship with
liquidity where higher profitability is consistent with higher liquidity levels. This
contradicts our n priori assumption where a tradeoff exists between liquidity and
profitability. (Bonfim & Moshe, 2012)had results that were consistent with our n pri-
oriassumptions. The contradiction in the ROA can be looked at as two-stage pro-
cess. First and foremost, given a fixed level of loans, an increase in deposits can spur
acquisition of financial investments such as government securities or increases in
the placements to other banks. This leads to an infusion of liquid assets into the
bank hence a boost in liquidity, which explains the movements in LDR and LAR.
Secondly, as the level of liquid assets expands, interest earned from these securities
also increases, thereby boosting profit before tax and increasing profitability
through ROA.
Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Results from (Bonfim & Moshe, 2012) corroborate with those found here as far as
Tier 1 Capital ratio is concerned. The contradiction between anticipated and actual
results can be explained this way: an investment in liquid assets, which are- by defi-
nition- less risky, would result in a drop in the level of Risk Weighted Assets and an
increase in the Tier 1 Capital ratio.
Log Assets
According to results from (Bonfim & Moshe, 2012), bank size (as measured by Log
Assets) is inversely related to liquidity. This expectation is upended in our analysis
where Log Assets exhibits a positive relationship with liquidity i.e. bigger banks are
more liquid. A potential explanation for this contradiction could be that bigger
banks can afford to be more liquid in that their profitability is not as adversely af-
fected as it would be in the case of smaller banks.
Cost-to-income Ratio
(Bonfim & Moshe, 2012) had results consistent with our n priori assumption where
more expensive (i.e. less efficient) banks end up being less iiquid. Our results are, at
the very least, puzzling since they contradict this assumption wherein less efficient
banks are more liquid. A potential explanation for this contradiction remains elusive



















I 4.3. Sign: Anticipated and Actual Results
[
r
Some assumptions were made as to the expected nature of the relationship between
the core bank indicators and liquidity indicators.
With regard to profitability (net interest margin & re turn on assets), it was assumed
that the greater the amount of liquid assets a bank held, the less profitable it would
be on average. In other words, there would be a tradeoff between profitability and
liquidity hence a negative relationship.
As far as efficiency (cost-to-income ratio) was concerned, banks that were less
skilled at managing their costs might ultimately end up holding less liquid assets
and vice versa. Consequently, lower efficiency would result in lower liquidity, i.e. a
direct relationship between liquidity and efficiency.
Bank specialization (net loans to total assets ratio) related to the lending function of
a bank. It was assumed that the more specialized a bank was, i.e. having a higher
proportion of assets as loans and advances, the less liquid they would ultimately be.
Capital adequacy (Tier 1 & Total Capital ratios) reflects a bank's ability to absorb
losses. It was assumed that a bank with greater levels of capital adequacy would
hold less liquid assets (an inverse relationship). This is because a bank would have a
greater ability to absorb losses hence requiring fewer resources tied up in liquid as-
sets.
As far as Bank Size (log Assets) was concerned, it was assumed that larger banks re-
quired less liquid assets as buffers against potential deterioration given economies-
of-scale advantages. This translates to an inverse relationship where greater size
comes with lower liquidity levels.
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5. Conclusions, Limitations & Recommendations
5.1. Conclusions
Fro m the dis cussion above, we can conclude that of all the core bank indicators,
Net Loans to Total Assets (NLAR), a measure of specializa tion, is by far the
most sign ificant determinant of the liqu idity posi tion in listed Ken yan Commer-
cial Banks . This und erlines the basic fact that the proportion of loans to total as-
sets is an extremely important metric in managing the liquidity position in a
bank's balance sheet.
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, as a measure of capital adequacy, comes a close second,
though the nature of its relationship to the liquidity indicators is puzzling and
contradicts our a priori assumption. Total Capital Ratio is a distant third, since
it's only significant with Loans to Deposits Ratio as the liquidity indicator.
5.2. Limitations & Recommendations
The key limitation faced in this study was that the sample was limited to listed
commercial banks. Since this set consists of firms categorized as 'Tier I.' banks,
any conclusions made can only properly apply to that set.
Hence, as a recommendation for future research, expanding the sample to -in-
clude 'Tier 2' and 'Tier 3' banks would provide more robust results that can be
widely applicable.
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:.: 10 0 1 10 69 .43 366 1:,7 .1 824 8 - 2 5 8. 3 64 9 - 2 3 6 . 7 61 1
:.: 1 10 1 10 69 .43366 1 3 7 .182 4 7 - 2 60. 3 64 9 - :2 ~ 1 . ; tS:i.:'
x20 0 liO 69 . 433 6 6 125 .2157 4 - 2 42 . 43 15 - 2 3 1. 62 95
x 22 0 110 69 .43366 125.21 57 3 - 2 4 4 . 43 15 - 2 3 6 . 33
Note: N=Ob s used i n c a l c u l a t in g 8 I C; see [R] BIC no te
TnNe 8
7.5 . Model 2 (lar)
7.5 .l.After Round 1
est tabl e y100 y110 , st ar s ta t s( N)
Var iable y10 0 y 110
ni m - . 61 63 40 05 - . 61 63 40 0 5
roa . 18 33 8 902 . 1 83 3 8 90 2
ci r2 . 00 0 7 44 14 . 0 00 7 44 1 4
n1ar - . 8 93 47 0 1 9 ** * - . 89 3 47 0 1 9* "
t lca pr at io . 45 34 03 65 . 45 34 0 36 5 '
t c t .lcaprat i o - . 3 2 987 77 -. 3 2 9 6 7 7 7 ·
log BA . 03 6 3 93 3 6 " • . 0 36 3 93 3 6
- cons . 1 3 5 2 1 9 2 9 . 1:)5 2 1 9 2 9
N 110 1 10
l e g e nd : p <0 . 0 5 ; .. p< O. Ol ; ** • p <O. OOl
7.5 .2.After Round 2
e st t a b l e y 200 y 220 , st a r s tat s (N)
Va r i a b le y 200 y 220
n l a r - . 8 32 5 23 69 ' " - . 8 32 52 3 6 9 ' "
tl c apra ti o . 37 34 1 9 63 . 3 73 4 1 9 63
t o t lca p rat io - . 27 5 72 1 69 - . 27 5 72 1 6 9
- cons . 77 4 678 15 ' " . 7 74 67 6 15'"
N 11 0 11 0




7.5.3.Goodness of fit summary
es t s t c t s )'1 0 0 )' 1 10 )'2 00 )' 2 2 0
!v1 c d e l Ob s 1 1 (nu l l ) II (:noc e l) df .".' C " , C
)' 10 0 1 10 11 7 . 90 7 6 18 0 . 7199 8 - 3 ~ S . ~ :; ~ 6 - :; 2 2 . S 2 S ~
1'1 10 110 1 17 .9076 18 0 .7199 7 - 3 4 7 . ~ 3 9 5 - 3 .2 E . 53 6 ~
y20 0 11 0 11 7 .90 7 6 169 . 0.:0 3 ,; - :0 :0 0 . 0 8 65 - 3 ~ ~ . 2 E '; 6
)'2 2 0 11 0 11 7. 90 76 169 . 0 4 33 3 -3 3 2 . 0 8 65 - 32 3 . 98 5 1
Note : N=Obs used in calculating SIC ; see [ R] BI C note
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